Accidents will happen: so what improves workplace safety? by Carrie Conaway
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in early January of 2003, an ugly truth was finally
brought to light. McWane Inc., a manufacturer of 
cast iron sewer and water pipe based in Birmingham,
Alabama, made headlines as one of the most dangerous
places to work in North America, following a nine-
month investigation by the New York Times, Frontline,
and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s The Fifth
Estate. The company, employing 5,000 people, had
more than 4,600 documented worker injuries since
1995, including nine deaths, and had been cited by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration for
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over 400 violations of workplace safety regulations. 
Pipe manufacturing is a notoriously dangerous
industry to begin with, but McWane’s injury rates
were far above industry averages. Employees rou-
tinely worked 16-hour shifts without breaks in a 
super-heated workplace where temperatures some-
times reached over 130 degrees, with dust, dirt, and
grime thickening the air and coating every surface.
Safety guards were removed from machinery to
speed their operation. Broken machines were kept
in action. Managers even went so far as to cut costs
by rationing crushed ice for workers’ drinks. 
The very fact that the McWane story is so shock-
ing is testimony to the fact that we now expect our
workplaces to be clean, quiet, and safe. While
McWane is surely not unique, it comes across more
as a recalcitrant employer of a bygone era than as a
typical modern business. But the McWane experi-
ence tells us more than just that times have changed.
It also highlights the important role of the work en-
vironment—workplace regulations, economic con-
ditions, insurance incentives, and organizational
culture—in encouraging firms to embrace safety.
And these same environmental factors reveal a great
deal about workplace safety in society as a whole.
WORKPLACE SAFETY IN THE 
INDUSTRIAL ERA
The history of the early years of industrialization
abounds with stories of the injuries, illnesses, and
premature deaths associated with factory and farm
work. Inspections of New England textile mills in
the 1870s found poor ventilation, high levels of dust,
noise, heat, and humidity, and frequent injuries.
Many other common occupations of the era, such
as making matches, tending tannery vats, and han-
dling wool, also resulted in injuries and disease.
While no consistent statistics on workplace safety
were collected at that time, accounts from the era in-
dicate that workplaces were dangerous indeed.
But these dangers did not go unnoticed. Organi-
zations concerned with working conditions started
investigating the problems of workplace safety and
health as early as the 1830s, not long after industri-
alization  began.  And  beginning  in  1869,  when
Massachusetts established the first state bureau of
labor statistics, state agencies began collecting data
and conducting inspections of workplaces to docu-
ment both health and safety hazards and safe work
practices. About a decade later, states also began to
pass “factory acts” establishing regulations and in-
spections to ensure that workplaces had adequate
ventilation, emergency exits, procedures for safe
machinery repair, and so forth. Later on, Workers’
Compensation legislation spread quickly once it was
first adopted in Wisconsin in 1911; 43 states had
passed Workers’ Compensation laws by 1921. Even
so, egregious behavior on the part of employers was
not uncommon. Perhaps the best-known example
is the Triangle Waist Company in New York City,
where in March 1911, a fire broke out and 146 work-
ers were trapped and killed because the exit doors
were locked. But at the same time, historical re-
search from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows
that there was less resistance from employers to the
regulations than one might have expected—perhaps
because making all employers comply eliminated
any competitive disadvantage to improving safety. 
The lack of reliable data on injuries and illnesses
made it difficult to track the state of the nation’s 
safety record until 1970, when Congress passed the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. In 1973, the
first year for which reliable data are available, 11 out
of every 100 workers were injured on the job (see
chart at left). Since then, the road to a safer work-
place has not been an entirely smooth one. The in-
jury and illness rate declined from the
early 1970s through the mid-1980s.
Some of these gains were lost in the
1980s, with injury rates jumping 13
percent in only six years. In 1992,
however, injuries turned the corner,
declining to historic lows by 2001. In
that year, less than 6 percent of work-
ers were injured on the job—the low-
est rate since data collection began. 
FEDERAL REGULATORS STEP IN
Until 1970, safety was primarily con-
sidered a concern of businesses and
state governments—not a matter for
the federal government. But work-
place injury rates started to creep up
in the 1960s, and there were also
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A Picture of Health
Workplace injuries and illnesses have declined since OSHA was
created in 1970, but the road to safety has been bumpy because of
changes in regulations, insurance, and the economy.
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some highly visible workplace accidents at that time
(most notably, a major mine explosion in Farming-
ton, West Virginia, that killed 78 workers). Further,
states were beginning to complain about the lack of
consistent federal standards, as regulation discrep-
ancies meant that employers could threaten to move
to other states with more lenient and less costly
Workers’  Compensation  regulations.  Likewise,
unions and worker advocates were concerned that
employees’ compensation for the same injury could
vary dramatically from state to state. 
These concerns led Congress to take the first fed-
eral-level action on workplace safety, establishing
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) in 1970. OSHA’s primary mission is to en-
act and enforce federal safety regulations. It takes
both a carrot and a stick approach, offering techni-
cal assistance and information on best practices as
well as inspecting firms and issuing citations and
fines to offending employers. It also compiles sta-
tistics to track the country’s safety record.
All these activities should help reduce workplace
accidents. But since its inception, OSHA’s ability to
actually influence accident rates has been ques-
tioned by employers and economists alike. It is
probably true that the initial drop in injuries and ill-
nesses in the early 1970s is related to OSHA, but it
is not clear whether this was a direct impact of the
agency’s regulatory efforts or whether it occurred





for nearly 45 percent
of workplace injuries
and illnesses in 2001.
States regulated workplace safety for years, 
but there were no federal rules until 1970
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In the mid-to-late 1980s, the U.S. experienced its only sus-
tained increase in workplace injuries since OSHA started
keeping records in 1973. The injury rate increased from 7.6
injuries per 100 workers in 1983 to 8.9 per 100 in 1992, while
the number of workers reporting injuries increased from 4.8
million to 6.8 million. What happened?
Much of the increase derived from increased attention to a
newly identified workplace injury—ergonomic, or muscu-
loskeletal, disorders. Up until then, most workers viewed
the ganglions, tendinitis, and carpal tunnel syndrome they
acquired after years of work on factory lines or in offices as 
a natural part of having a job. These problems were rarely
reported to OSHA and therefore comprised only a small por-
tion of reported injuries and illnesses. But in the 1980s, OSHA
started levying citations and fines against major manufactur-
ers like Hanes Knitware and Samsonite for ergonomic hazards
in their workplaces, and workers and employers alike started
taking ergonomic injuries more seriously. Nearly 750,000 peo-
ple reported a musculoskeletal disorder due to their work
environment in 1992. 
A second important factor: Health care costs of all kinds
were on the rise. In the traditional health insurance market,
these trends precipitated a shift toward managed care pro-
grams that tried to curb costs by restricting access to special-
ists and expensive treatments. But Workers’ Compensation
insurers could not quickly adopt the same techniques because
major changes in Workers’ Compensation benefits and premi-
ums required state legislative action. And since Workers’
Compensation allowed for more flexibility and choice in treat-
ment, more illnesses and injuries were treated under Workers’
Compensation than otherwise might have been.
But there was also another more subtle and complicated
cause for the increase. Workers’ Compensation insurers now
faced unexpectedly high claims because of the increase in
ergonomic injuries and cost-shifting into the Workers’
Compensation system. Because of regulations, however, in
the short run insurers could neither increase premiums nor
cut back on the types of injuries that were covered. (Prices
eventually did rise—indeed, employers were paying nearly
double the premiums in 1994 that they were in 1986—but
costs were still increasing faster than premiums.) Insurers
began to refuse to cover any companies that they expected to
generate significant claims. 
As a result, the residual risk pool—the group of employ-
ers denied traditional Workers’ Compensation coverage and
covered instead by the state-established insurer of last
resort—grew enormously. (See chart at left.) Nationwide, 
the share of employers in the residual risk pool increased
from about 5 percent in 1984 to nearly 30 percent in 1993,
though these rates varied widely by state. (Over 90 percent 
of employers in Rhode Island in 1989 were in the residual 
risk pool.) 
Though the premiums paid by employers in the residual
risk pool are obviously higher than traditional Workers’
Compensation rates, they are often also partially subsidized by
the state and incompletely experience rated—decreasing the
incentive for these already more dangerous employers to
reduce their workplace risks. Furthermore, residual-market
insurers themselves are less likely to encourage safe work
practices since they are typically compensated by a formula
that doesn’t take into consideration any safety improvements
they promote. Though the impact of all this on the nation’s
safety record might be negligible when the pool is small, it
multiplies considerably when large proportions of employers
are covered by the insurer of last resort.
Thus in the 1980s, injuries increased not because Workers’
Compensation insurance was inherently flawed, but because
the world it operated in had changed. Its regulatory structure
wasn’t flexible enough to handle the double whammy of
increasing reported injuries and growing numbers of employ-
ers in the residual risk pool, and the nation’s safety record
deteriorated as a result. It’s difficult to say how much these
factors contributed to the increase in injuries and illnesses at
that time, and other factors such as economic growth proba-
bly also played a role. But everything else in the work environ-
ment would have predicted a decline in injuries during that
period, not an increase—and the trend only reversed itself
once state legislatures began reforming their Workers’
Compensation statutes to allow for higher premiums, reduced
benefits, and more flexibility. 
Why did injuries rise in the 1980s?








note: 2002 figure is preliminary.
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Insurer of last resort
The number of employers who could not obtain traditional Workers’
Compensation insurance spiked in the late 1980s as insurers, faced
with high costs, refused to cover many firms.
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place safety issues. A classic study by Harvard econ-
omist Kip Viscusi examining the impact of OSHA
inspections and penalties in the agency’s first few
years showed no effects on either injury rates or
company investments in safety. Several other re-
searchers, using both industry-wide and firm- or in-
dustry-specific data, have also found little or no
measurable effect of OSHA. But this is not a uni-
versally agreed-upon result. One study shows that
going through an OSHA inspection reduces the
number of citations on subsequent inspections by
about one-half, without accounting for any addi-
tional improvements in safety due purely to the pos-
sibility of being inspected. And a study of manu-
facturing plants in the early 1980s found that if an
inspection led to a penalty, injuries would decline at
the inspected plant by over 20 percent during the
next few years. 
One reason for these mixed results is measure-
ment problems. The increased awareness that comes
with new regulations leads initially to increased re-
porting of injuries that previously would have gone
uncounted—so that the reported injury rate may be
going up at the same time that the actual number of
injuries may be constant or even decreasing. This
makes it hard to know what proportion of any
change in injuries, whether positive or negative, to
attribute to regulatory efforts. Also, during most of
the 1980s the agency followed a “records check”
procedure whereby firms with high prior violations
were more likely to be inspected again—giving em-
ployers an incentive to underreport workplace in-
juries and further confusing the relationship be-
tween reported and actual injuries. 
A second reason for these results is the constraints
under which OSHA operates. OSHA inspects just
a small number of employers—in 2002, only about
100,000 out of the approximately 8 million work-
place establishments in the U.S. And when it does
find violations, the fines are often quite small. The
fine for a typical, nonegregious violation cannot ex-
ceed $7,000, and overall the agency meted out a to-
tal of only $73 million in penalties in 2002. Finally,
it does not have regulations for all the potential caus-
es of workplace injuries; for example, there is no
OSHA standard for ergonomic or musculoskeletal
injuries, which account for one-third of all injuries
on the job. It is difficult for the agency to have a large
impact under these circumstances. 
On the other hand, compliance appears to be bet-
ter than one might expect given the small probabil-
ity of actually being inspected, a result that econo-
mist David Weil attributes in part to employers
making compliance decisions “on the basis of po-
tential, rather than actual, penalties” and in part to
employers learning about the cost savings they can
reap by following OSHA regulations. Nonetheless,
it seems clear that while OSHA may help improve
safety, the agency cannot be solely responsible for
the  overall  decline  in  injuries  since  the  1970s.
Though the story of the trend in workplace safety
may begin with OSHA, it cannot end there.
THE CHANGING ECONOMY
Another element in the story is the state of the econ-
omy. Historically, economists have thought that
workplace injuries are more likely to happen in pe-
riods of fast employment growth, when workers are
often either less experienced or working harder than
usual. This may have been part of the problem at
McWane in the 1990s; the New York Timesreport-
ed that some McWane plants’ worker turnover rates
exceeded 100 percent per year. Inexperience may
also have been a factor in the overall increase in in-
juries in the late 1980s, an era of economic expan-
sion that drew many new workers into the labor
market. But the next expansionary
period, the mid-to-late 1990s, saw
declines in injuries and illnesses even
as the economy grew; so the rela-
tionship  between  growth  and  in-
juries is now less clear. Whether oth-
er factors trumped the pro-cyclical
effects of the economy or whether
growth no longer affects safety has
not yet been determined.
A more important economic factor
is shifts in the mix of jobs in the
economy, since the most hazardous
occupations and industries are far
less common in the United States
than they were a generation ago.
Though some dangerous jobs, like
truck driving and nursing, continue
Workers are much
more likely to be
injured on the job
than to get sick.
Acute and chronic
work-related 
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Fewer but safer jobs in manufacturing
The drops in manufacturing’s share of employment and injuries
have spurred improvements in the nation’s safety record.
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to be well represented, many of the most unsafe jobs
(like timber cutting and deep-sea fishing) have be-
come less so. Meanwhile, employment in safer oc-
cupations such as computer specialist and desktop
publisher is expected to grow faster than average.
Indeed, if the industry mix in the U.S. had not
changed since 1973, there would have been about 10
percent more workplace injuries in 2001 than actu-
ally occurred. 
Employment shifts out of manufacturing are a
particularly important driver of this trend. Manu-
facturing is one of the most dangerous ways to earn
a living in the U.S.; more than 8 out of every 100
manufacturing workers were injured on the job in
2001. But manufacturing’s share of overall employ-
ment has declined from 30 percent to 16 percent
since 1973 (see chart on page 16). So one would ex-
pect the overall injury rate to be declining also. And
in fact, rough calculations show that shifts out of
manufacturing jobs account for at least half of the 10
percent decline in injuries resulting from the chang-
ing industry mix.
THE INSURANCE INCENTIVE
For the most part, changes in regulations and the
economy have improved the nation’s safety record.
Jobs today are safer, and fewer people
work in the most dangerous occupations
New Englanders
are just as likely to
be injured on the
job as workers 
in other regions,
but our fatality rate
is one of the lowest
in the nation.What is the deadliest job in America?
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 5,524 fatalities in
civilian workplaces in 2002. But which jobs are the deadliest?
By number of deaths, commercial truck driving is the dead-
liest occupation. 808 truck drivers (out of 3.2 million total)
were killed on the job last year—80 percent of them on the
road. Many other common occupations also experience 
a large number of deaths: for example, farm workers, 
construction laborers, police and detectives, and electricians.
Measuring the number of deaths is particularly useful for
regulators and insurers who want to cut overall fatalities; a
small improvement in safety for an occupation with a large
number of workers can have a major bottom-line effect.
Which occupation had the highest fatality rate? The fatali-
ty rate, calculated as deaths per 100,000 people, accounts
for the fact that some occupations are much more common
than others. For example, 162 store owners and managers
were killed on the job in 2002, making it the fifth most deadly
occupation as measured by number of deaths. But since
nearly 5 million people work as sales supervisors, only 3.4
store supervisors per 100,000 died on the job—a rate better
than the national average. 
Fatality rates are preferable when trying to compare the
risk of death across occupations. By this measure, truck dri-
ving and construction are still deadly, but they no longer top
the list. Instead, timber cutters lead the index, with a fatality
rate more than 30 times the national average. Last year about
one out of every 750 lumberjacks died on the job, a stagger-
ing figure. Many of the occupations that people think of as
hazardous have lower rates. Construction workers are
eleventh on the list (28 deaths per 100,000 workers), fire-
fighters are thirteenth (20 per 100,000), and police are eigh-
teenth (12 per 100,000). But the jobs with the highest fatality
rates account for a very small fraction of workers nationwide.
Only one—farm occupations—employs more than 0.2 per-
cent of the labor force, while teachers, for comparison, clock
in at 4.1 percent. 
On the flip side, what is the safest occupation? It is diffi-
cult to say, but a major contender is: economist. None has
died on the job since the government started keeping
records. —Brad Hershbein
Selected occupations with the 
highest number of fatalities
occupation fatalities fatality rate
Truck drivers 808 25.0
Farm occupations 519 28.0
Construction laborers 302 27.7
Non-construction laborers 181 14.3
Store owners and managers 162 3.4
Groundskeepers and gardeners 146 15.0
Police and detectives 140 11.6
Retail sales workers 132 1.9
Electricians 116 13.5
Vehicle mechanics 115 6.3
Top ten (17.5 percent of workforce) 2,621 10.9
All occupations 5,524 4.0
Selected occupations with the 
highest fatality rates
occupation fatalities fatality rate 
Timber cutters and loggers 72 133.3
Fishers 33 73.3
Airplane pilots and navigators 90 69.8
Structural metalworkers 39 58.2
Drilling and mining workers 58 50.4
Sailors and ship officers 27 46.6
Driver-sales workers 58 37.9
Roofers 87 37.0
Electrical power installers & repairers 41 32.5
Farm occupations 519 28.0
Top ten (2.1 percent of workforce) 1,024 36.1
All occupations 5,524 4.0
note: Data are for 2002  source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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But Workers’ Compensation has had mixed results.
Workers’ Compensation was the nation’s first social
insurance program. Before it was instituted, repa-
ration for workplace injuries and deaths was based
on establishing legal liability for the accident. In-
jured workers had to demonstrate in court that their
employers were the sole cause of their injury. This
led to unpredictable and capricious legal outcomes
for both sides. Workers rarely won, but when they
did, they typically received large settlements. 
To solve this problem, states began enacting
Workers’ Compensation statutes based on the prin-
ciples  of  the  German  system  of  compensation,
which had been established several decades prior.
Neither side had to establish liability for a workplace
injury. Instead, employers were required to carry in-
surance to cover all injuries in the workplace, re-
gardless of fault. Insurance premiums were “expe-
rience rated” so that more dangerous firms and
industries paid higher rates.
The safety incentives that Workers’ Compensa-
tion creates are complicated. On the one hand, in-
surance provides employers with a clear reason to
reduce safety hazards; their premiums should de-
crease when they implement safer work practices.
On the other hand, it may discourage workers from
working safely, since they are guaranteed at least
some replacement of their wages if they are injured
on the job. As a result, the early years after Work-
ers’ Compensation was implemented were spent
working out kinks in the system that had led, for ex-
ample, to increased injury rates in the mining in-
dustry. (A guarantee of income meant that miners,
paid by the ton rather than by the hour, had less in-
centive to spend time on safety precautions.) Most
industries, however, experienced injury declines.
Nearly a century later, several studies by econo-
mist Richard Butler and colleagues indicate that as
Workers’ Compensation benefits rise, workers are
likely both to take more risks while working and to
report claims on injuries that they might have let go
at a lower benefit rate. To combat some of these ef-
fects, state legislatures have tweaked their Work-
ers’ Compensation statutes in recent years. States
have introduced changes like increased deductibles
for employers, increased waiting times before ben-
efits kick in, increased penalties for fraud, and
greater incentives to return employees to work as
quickly as possible after an injury. But in the end,
the incentives that Workers’ Compensation insur-
ance creates today are not much different than they
were nearly 100 years ago.
What has become more complicated in recent
years, however, is how those incentives interact with
events outside the insurance system and how those
interactions affect workplace safety. In the 1980s, for
instance, a spike in reported injury rates led to in-
creasing insurance costs, which led to more em-
ployers being covered by the state insurer of last re-
sort—both of which ultimately resulted in the only
sustained  increase  in  workplace  injuries  since
OSHA began keeping records. (See sidebar on page
14.) Market forces caused these changes, not Work-
ers’ Compensation—but the economic structure of
Workers’ Compensation compounded their effects. 
INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION
In the end, though, these factors affect safety be-
cause of the policies and procedures of particular or-
ganizations. Safety-conscious employers may, for
example, follow OSHA’s recommendations by or-
ganizing health and safety committees: groups of
employees who work together to ferret out and elim-
inate safety risks in the workplace. Others may get
involved with OSHA programs that outline best
practices for their industry, or they may help devel-
op voluntary compliance programs aimed at im-
proving safety. 
Likewise, employers in a period of industry or
firm growth may reduce risks by providing more
safety training to their workers or hiring a new safe-
ty manager. Or they may adapt to the pressures of
Workers’ Compensation by installing antiskid mats
in restaurants, ergonomically designed keyboards
and chairs for typists, or safety guards on produc-
tion machinery—all of which can help to cut claims
costs.  While  employers  may  be  making  these
changes partially due to the incentives they face—
the carrot of reduced Workers’ Compensation pre-
miums or the stick of potential OSHA citations—
these incentives also create an environment in which
promoting safety is the easy, economically rational
thing to do. 
What’s more, many employers enact stricter safe-
ty protocols than what is statutorily required of
them. One example is McWane’s cross-town rival,
the American Cast Iron Pipe Company (ACIPCO).
ACIPCO faces the same regulations, economic
conditions, and insurance restrictions as McWane.
But rather than making headlines as one of the na-
tion’s most unsafe employers, ACIPCO instead has
made Fortune’s list of the best employers in the
country. And the New York Times reports that
ACIPCO has one-fortieth the number of OSHA ci-
tations as McWane. ACIPCO has apparently found
a better way to do business, perhaps in part because
it is worker owned (the company was willed to its
workers in 1924 by its original owner) or perhaps for
other reasons. In any case, they have been able to do
what McWane has not—operate within the con-
straints of their environment to create a workplace
that is both productive and healthy. S
for more
information
Occupational Safety
and Health
Administration
www.osha.gov
Bureau of Labor
Statistics
www.bls.gov
National 
Safety Council 
www.nsc.org
National Council
on Compensation
Insurance
www.ncci.com